A CRITIQUE OF SITUATED COGNITION |
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Anderson, et al, have listed what they see as the four central claims of a
situated learning perspective and have argued each is flawed:
- Action is grounded in the concrete situation in which it occurs.
Objection: It is true that Brazilian street sellers, who correctly calculate
the cost of items which they sell in the streets, are unable to answer similar
questions at school. But this is a demonstration that skills practiced outside
of schools do not generalize to schools, not that arithmetic procedures taught
in the classroom cannot be used by shop keepers. Indeed, skills like reading
clearly transfer from one context to another.
- Knowledge does not transfer between tasks. Objection: The psychological
literature contains both success and failures to achieve transfer. Transfer
between tasks depends on the amount of practice in the initial domain and the
degree of shared cognitive elements. For example, subjects who learned one
text editor learned subsequent editors more rapidly, with the number of
procedural elements shared by two text editors predicting the amount of
transfer.
- Training in abstraction is of little use. Objection: This, Anderson, et
al, say has been extended into an advocacy for apprenticeship training by
those taking a situated perspective. In contrast, Anderson, et al, advocate a
combination of abstract instruction and concrete examples. When they
introduced real-world-like problems to situate high school algebra, they felt
much class time was wasted on such clerical tasks as tabling and graphing,
while relatively little time was spent relating algebraic expressions to the
real-world situations. [Koedinger, et al, "Intelligent tutoring goes to school
in the big city," in Proceedings of the 7th World Conference on Artificial
Intelligence in Education, AACE, 1995, pp. 421-428.] We wonder whether
their observation was due to the kinds of problems used or the teaching.
- Instruction must be done in complex, social environments. Objection:
Research in psychology shows training is often more effective when nearly
independent parts are practiced first, before combining them. In team sports
and orchestras, more time is spent on individual practice than group practice,
although both are necessary. (Shouldn't the kind of knowledge, whether
procedural or conceptual, matter? Learning how to factor and understanding the
nature and uses of functions seem quite different.) Anderson, et al, also
question the efficacy of cooperative learning when applied without requisite
structuring or scripting.
[Cf. Anderson, Reder, and Simon, "Situated Learning and
Education," Educational Researcher, May 1996, pp. 5-11.]
A RESPONSE FROM THE SITUATED VIEW
The thrust of Greeno's response is,
not so much to take issue with the objections of Anderson, et al, as to note
that the purported claims are not those of situated cognition. Their
critique seems to have missed the point about what adherents of situated
cognition are actually studying and claiming -- they present a straw man, or
caricature, which they knock down.
Whereas the cognitive perspective attempts to explain processes and
structures at the level of individuals, the situated perspective focuses on
interactive systems and the resulting "trajectories" of individual
participation. It borrows research methods and conceptual frameworks from
ethnography, discourse analysis, symbolic interactionism, and sociocultural
psychology. Greeno sees the significance of studies like that of the Brazilian
street sellers who can successfully make change, but do not use the algorithms
taught in school, as showing that reasoning is adaptive in ways that are not
well explained by current cognitive theory.
Knowledge is not just "in the head," if it is to be found there at all,
rather knowledge consists in the ways a person interacts with other people and
situations. The situated perspective does not say that group learning will
always be productive, regardless of how it is organized, or that individual
practice cannot contribute to a person's becoming a more successful participant
in social practices. It does call for more varied learning situations. For
mathematics, this means more than collective watching and listening, doing
exercises individually, and displaying individual knowledge on tests. Students
need opportunities to participate actively by formulating and evaluating
problems, questions, conjectures, conclusions, arguments, and examples.
>From the situative perspective, successful transfer means improved
participation. Whether transfer occurs depends on how the situation is
transformed. Whether it is difficult or easy for the learner depends on how the
learner was "attuned to the constraints and affordances" in the initial learning
activity. For example, when students are given instruction about refraction
prior to shooting targets under water, they are more likely to become attuned to
the apparent angular disparity of a projectile's trajectory before and after
entering the water, and hence, perform better. Greeno also distinguishes between
abstraction and generality using an example from mathematics. If students learn
correct rules for manipulating symbols without learning that mathematical
expressions represent concepts and relationships, what they learn may be
abstract, but it is not general (i.e., cannot be widely used).
What is needed, according to Greeno, is an integration of the cognitive and
situative research perspectives that, until recently, have developed quite
separately.
[Cf. Greeno, "On Claims that Answer the Wrong Questions," Educational
Researcher, January/February 1997, pp. 5-17. Anderson, et al's response
follows on pp. 18-21.]